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This paper proposes a new scheme of personal income taxation that would
eliminate inefficiencies arising from differences in the tax treatment of
investments in intangible human capital and other types of capital formation. It
also would offset the exacerbation of those distortions due to progressive income
taxation, without requiring the latter’s abandonment. The tax regime proposed
here would permit full deductibility of private costs of education and training, but
defer the exercise of the deduction credits. A novel instrument for achieving these
objectives is an individually held, non-transferable asset: an untaxed, interest-
bearing educational (expense) deduction account -- christened the “UIBEDA. The
UIBEDA scheme facilitates shifting from direct educational subsidies to the use
of publicly subsidized student loans, and also can be readily extended to promote
selective immigration of workers who have incurred indebtedness for human
capital investments abroad.
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Reforming the Taxation of Human Capital:
A Modest Proposal for Promoting Economic Growth
This essay presents a new proposal to modify existing income tax regimes
in a way that would render them more supportive of human capital formation, and
hence more encouraging to long-term economic growth.
A bias against human capital formation expenditures presently exists in
many national tax codes, which tend to favor investments in tangible capital
formation and intangible business expenditures for R&D and in-house production
of computer software. Differentials in the tax treatment of different classes of
assets are “inefficient” in the static welfare-analytic sense, and the inefficiencies
become magnified where the various assets are strong complements in
production, or in consumption. Due to the complementarities between human
capital formation and the accumulation of other classes of productive assets, and
the role of human capital in generating technological and organizational
innovations,
1 this particular aspect of “non-neutrality” in the workings of the tax
system may well have significant perverse consequences for economic growth.
The progressive taxation of personal income, moreover, tends to
exacerbate the distortions in the allocation of investment that arise from the
failure of most modern tax regimes to treat human and non-human capital
formation in a neutral fashion. Because it proves more feasible under most tax
regimes to shelter personal property income streams from the effects of rising
marginal tax rates than is the case for wage and salary income, educational and
training investments that yield incremental earned income are particularly
punished.
To significantly reduce or eliminate progressive taxation of incomes will,
at best, offer only partial amelioration of the tax-induced distortions of
investment, and that approach to reform is an unattractive as a solution on other
counts. There are important non-instrumental, ethical reasons for redistributing
income to poorer members of society in the high income countries, as well as
reinforcing considerations that turn on the consequences of such redistributive
policies for productivity improvement and growth in developing countries. Taken
together, these constitute a cogent rationale against general proposals for tax
regime reforms that would have the effect of eliminating progressive taxation.
What then can be done? Rather than continuing the debates over radical
fiscal reforms – in which the elimination of income taxation and its replacement
by taxes levied only on consumption expenditures, or various “flat tax” proposals,
have figured prominently – a less ambitious, more pragmatic approach is
advocated here. Economists are more likely to be effective in this area if their
meliorative energies are directed to more modest, piece-meal proposals that do
not entail a disruptive overhaul of the entire tax regime.2
The reform proposed here would make the private costs of education and
training fully deductible expenditures for purposes of calculating individuals’
taxable income. But, instead of allowing the tax deduction to be claimed
immediately, or to be claimed by a third party, it would be credited to an account
in the name of the person receiving the qualified form of education and/or
training. Under the scheme envisaged, the value of this “deduction account”
would then grow at a rate equal to the real yield on long-term government debt,
up until the point at which it was exercised to reduce the personal income tax
liabilities of the individual account holder. The period within which this could be
done would be confined to a comparatively short time interval.
In effect, a novel financial instrument is proposed to achieve the objectives
of a tax regime that was “neutral” in its treatment of “intangible human capital”
and other productivity assets, without sacrificing the principle of progressive
taxation. It is an individually held, non-transferable financial asset: an untaxed,
interest-bearing educational (expense) deduction account. This novel device is
conveniently described by its acronym: UIBEDA” – which sounds like “we-
bedda.”
The strong rationale that can be found in the economics literature for
undertaking to reform the tax treatment of human capital formation is reviewed
briefly in section 1. This provides a background for the specific features of the
proposal that are set out in section 2. A concrete (numerical) illustration of the
operation of the scheme is supplied in Section 3. The conditions under which the
UIBEDA scheme could satisfy an inter-temporal balanced budget constraint are
examined in Section 4, which broaches the important empirical question of how
potent this form of subsidy would be in inducing incremental human capital
investments that yielded larger earned income streams, and hence enlarged future
tax revenues. Section 5 calls attention to two further, and distinctive virtues of
the proposed scheme. One is that there is no reason to prevent the recipients of
this form of educational subsidy from finding employment for their acquired
skills outside their “home” labor markets. The second is that the governments of
skill-deficient regions need not restrict the scope of the UIBEDA scheme to their
respective native born populations or domestic residents. UIBEDA accounts thus
lend themselves readily to use in implementing liberal policies of selective
immigration and emigration.
The essay concludes in section 6 with some remarks on the importance of
setting in place provisions that establish “credible commitment” to this scheme on
the part of the State, and related issues concerning the appropriate time-horizon
for such commitments.3
1. The Fiscal Bias against Human Capital Formation: Diagnosis and
Previously Proposed Remedies
Although the process of developing human capabilities through education
and other kinds of training may yield consumption satisfactions for the recipients,
today the process is regarded widely as an investment activity from which will
flow an incremental stream of future human productive services (and
corresponding earnings). Systems of taxation that treat workers as agents of
production (analogous to machines) distort the allocation of resources in a
direction that militates against human capital formation. The personal income tax
is the prime exemplar of such systems.
Contrary to common opinion, examination of modern tax codes in the US,
UK and some other advanced economies reveals that some portion of human
capital investments actually may be taxed more heavily than the financial
investment and tangible physical investments made by households.
2 This state of
affairs has emerged clearly where (for the ostensible purpose of raising the
national conventional personal savings rate) special tax provisions have permitted
the sheltering of income in pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and
other savings vehicles. The use of the latter class of instruments for shifting
income from the present into the future has thus been favored in comparison with
others that can accomplish the same purpose – human capital investment being
prominent among them.
On the other hand, it can be pointed out that under conventional systems
of income taxation (which are based upon current earnings rather than the accrual
accounting method that typically apply in the cases of physical capital-goods)
human capital investments are a favored vehicle for young households to use in
transferring income (and consumption) into the future.
3 But, as will be seen
shortly, the thrust of this observation is considerably blunted when one considers
the structure of marginal income tax rates.
General formulations of optimal tax theory, such as the classic papers of
Diamond and Mirrilees (1971), consequently have argued that there should be no
taxes levied on intermediate goods. Plainly, human capital investments fall under
the heading of intermediate goods, as they are an instrumentality for shifting
resources from the present to the future. But, the practical implications for policy
design that can be derived from optimal taxation principles remain less than
immediately clear. This is so because in practice human capital may be a mixture
of labor supply, capital investment and a final good, and because it may be
necessary to consider general equilibrium effects, as well as the first-order
impacts upon the behavior of individual agents.
4
To make headway towards specific policy recommendations in this area it
is helpful to reduce the tension between the principle that human capital (being
“an intermediate good”) should not be taxed at all, and the practical difficultiy of
attempting to tax income from labor services in a way that would not distort4
human capital investments. Thus, Judd (1998) suggests continuing to tax workers’
incomes but immediately expensing all human capital expenditures: the proposal
is to extend the (automatic) deductibility of foregone earnings costs to all direct
education and training outlays. Were a significant portion of educational (and/or
training) expenditures to represent “consumption” goods (or bads) it would be
appropriate to tax the portion of educational expenditures that generated these.
But, the obvious problems of strictly implementing such a tax policy suggest that
reasonably generous caps, instead, might be imposed on the deductibility of direct
education and training related expenditures.
5
Nevertheless, the elimination of taxation of all investment in human
capital has been recommended repeatedly by economists and tax analysts (e.g.,
Boskin 1977, and Kaplow 1996). This partial tax reform proposal, although quite
sweeping, nevertheless falls rather short of a “second-best” policy, because it is
not likely to result in a tax regime that is “neutral” with respect to the formation of
different types of capital.
6
Those who view the persistence of differential tax treatment of different
types of capital as a potential source of serious allocational inefficiencies cite this
among the arguments favoring still more radical reforms, such as the adoption of
taxes on consumption expenditures alone. But the consumption tax proposal -- to
which public finance economists widely subscribe -- compounds two distinct
departures from most existing tax regimes’ treatment of human capital. First, it
removes the tax disadvantage of human capital investments due to the difference
between the non-deductibility of the direct cost component of human capital
investment and the deductibility of depreciation charges on tangible non-human
capital. Second, by eliminating the taxation of labor income, it does away with the
effects of progressive marginal taxation on the amount of human capital invested
privately by individuals (both foregone earnings and direct educational and
training costs).
7
Although the abandonment of progressive taxation is from some
viewpoints the really radical aspect of “consumption tax” (and related “flat tax”)
schemes, that aspect of the reformers’ proposal is not a logical requirement of
shifting from labor incomes to consumption expenditures as the basis for taxation.
Furthermore, eliminating the inefficiencies in resource allocation created by
differential “tax wedges” (gaps between pre-tax and after-tax rates of return that
vary according to the type of asset) is not an obviously compelling goal for tax
policies to pursue. One should bear in mind here the trade-off between static
efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Thus, a consistent growth-promoting logic
may be read in the tax treatment of investment so as to favor both shorter-lived
tangible assets (and intangible non-human assets such as patents and software),
and comparatively long-lived, intangible human capital on the other hand.
8
As has been noted, the implications for human capital formation of
differences among tax regimes in the methods of income accounting are quite
separable from those that derive from the structure of marginal personal income5
tax rates. The typical progressive structure of the personal income tax schedules
exerts an unambiguously discouraging influence upon the use of investments in
human capital as vehicles for income- shifting. This effect is due entirely to the
temporal positioning of this particular mode of saving within the household’s life
cycle. The expensing of foregone earnings costs, as well as any deductions that
are allowed for direct education and training costs, comes during the early phase
of workers’ lives, when incomes and marginal tax rates are low in any case. But,
these investments, especially when supplemented by taking advantage of on-the-
job options, generate a rising stream of labor earnings that are exposed to higher
marginal rates under progressive tax regimes.
9
Is the adverse impact upon human capital investment really a serious
drawback of the progressive taxation of labor incomes? Good “natural”
experimental data might permit the matter to be resolved empirically, but in its
absence economists have turned to simulation models. The latter combine
theoretical specifications and parameters estimated from microeconomic data, in
order to create quantitative models of household behavior that can be used to
evaluate effects of hypothetical alternations in the regime of taxation.
10
According to the results obtained recently with such an approach by Dupor et al.
(1996), the substituting a flat tax schedule for progressive rates such as exist in
the US 1990 tax code would have a substantial impact: the simulation results
indicate that a 10 percent rise of the marginal tax rate over the increasing portion
of the individual earnings profile has the effect of reducing investment in human
capital by 15 percent.
11
Quite obviously it is important to consider the general equilibrium
repercussions of any significant tax policy changes. It is possible that the
immediate positive impact upon the level of human capital investments of setting
lower tax rates on labor income – vis-à-vis taxes levied on the returns to physical
capital – may well be substantially mitigated over the long run. Indeed, it might
be completely nullified by the induced change in the economy’s asset portfolio.
12
In the absence of countervailing skill-deepening biases in technological change,
the induced increase of the pace of accumulation of human capital (in relationship
to the supply of raw labor-power through population growth) should operate to
depress the marginal productivity of additional educational training.
Furthermore, to the extent that the contemplated tax reforms induce agents
to substitute human capital for physical capital investments, the long-run effect on
the level of physical capital per worker in the economy would depress the
marginal productivity of labor and drag down before-tax rates of return to human
capital.
13
Dynamic general equilibrium considerations of this kind are particularly
relevant when analyzing fiscal policy proposals for large, substantially closed
economies. In the situation of small and highly open economies, however, the
conclusions of the foregoing partial equilibrium analyses previously reviewed
remain more applicable, because when international financial flows and labor6
migration are unobstructed they tend to operate in the long-run to peg the before-
tax rates of return on human capital and physical capital investments. A small
open economy would thus be comparatively free of the counter-forces that which
otherwise might work to curtail the rise in the rate of human capital formation
among the indigenous population.
An economy that is open to the movements of workers from abroad, as
well as to commodity trade and capital flows, also presents an environment in
which reforms that positively affect the level of private after-tax returns on human
capital may gain added potency, by inducing selective immigration. These are
circumstances that characterize many among the smaller developed and
developing economies, for which the modest tax reform proposal presented the
following sections may well be particularly relevant.
As long as the effect of the reform is to push a substantial portion of the
distribution of after-tax private marginal yields on human capital above those
elsewhere, it is likely to draw in people with greater potential earnings capacities.
The pull would be stronger for individuals who also are more strongly disposed to
utilize their inherent and acquired capabilities to gain further education and
training, and ultimately to exploit that asset by entering the more highly
remunerated occupations.
14 The possibilities of exploiting such effects will
therefore be considered more closely (in Section 5) after the basic features of the
UIBEDA scheme have been detailed.
2. A New Proposal: Principal Features of UIBEDAs
The main task here is to set out the features of the proposed reform
instrument in detail sufficient to indicate the empirical information that would be
required to establish its general feasibility. Although this is best tackled by
offering concrete specifications of a hypothetical system, the particulars supplied
here are those which lend themselves well to purposes of exposition, rather than
engaging with the realities of existing administrative institutions and tax codes.
The goal in what follows is to stimulate further discussion of the basic idea, and
engage the expertise of those most acquainted with the institutional arrangements
that would render its implementation practical.
Let us start by considering the simplest practical circumstances, in which
direct costs of educational investment are met out of current income flows, as
would be the case either where the young adult student had independent means, or
was receiving inter vivo income transfers for the purpose from family members.
Under the proposed scheme, neither the recipient nor the household that had
borne these current direct costs would be allowed immediately to enjoy such tax
savings as would be generated by taking them as deductions from taxable income.
Instead, the nominal value of the tax savings would be recorded in the current
year’s tax return filed by the student, and would be credited to an untaxed7
interest-bearing deduction account (UIBEDA) established in the name of that
individual – and identified by a taxpayer number.
Comprehensiveness is desirable in defining “direct costs” for these
purposes. Thus, this category should be taken to include expenditures for tuition
and educational fees, for textbooks, equipment and supplies purchased in
connection with enrollment in formal training programs, as well as additional
expenses for living away from one’s place of residence whilst engaged in
educational and training. It should be understood that the phrase “formal training
programs” is meant to include instruction at accredited educational and training
institutions, and programs of on-the-job training whose reported costs to the
employer or other entity are accepted by the tax authority as an appropriately
deductible business expenditure.
15
The maximum life of these UIBEDAs would be set uniformly, with
consideration given to the possibility that post-university professional education,
and post-graduate training that occasioned direct costs should likewise generate
additional “credits” in the individual’s account. The actual life of an account,
however, would be a matter for the account-holder’s discretion within specified
limits. Thus, after some stipulated initial waiting period from the date at which it
was established, the account either could be liquidated, or that action could be
further deferred until some specified maximum age (of the account) was reached.
The aggregate nominal value of an UIBEDA – that is, of the portfolio consisting
of a bundle variously dated “certified deposits” (direct cost expenditures) each of
which would be growing exponentially at their respective government bond rates
– could be “cashed in” for the sole purpose of claiming deductions from the
account-holder’s domestic wage earnings.
Ideally, the UIBEDA should resemble a tax-free “retirement savings
bond” in at least one respect: its value grows at a fixed rate of interest (set at, say,
the Treasury’s long-term borrowing rate in the year that the credit was
established) through automatic reinvestment of yields, up to some maximum
attainable surrender value. But, unlike bonds, UIBEDAs would not be
transferable; nor would they throw off any “coupon” yields prior to being “cashed
in”; and they would have a variable surrender value even when held as long as
was possible.
Once the UIBEDA had been thus broached, the stream of annual tax
deductions would then resemble a term annuity, in that it would have to be taken
in equal amounts (or according to some other pre-specified formula) in each
consecutive year during a period of pre-defined length. But unlike annuities, their
monetary value would be the resulting annual tax-savings, and therefore would
depend upon the account holder’s current income, given the prevailing tax rate
schedule(s) that would apply to the UIBEDA account.
The benefits offered under this scheme in the form future personal tax-
savings are intended to induce the account holders to make use of such8
capabilities as they gain through human capital investment, by working at the
higher-income occupations that their education qualifies them to enter. The
restrictions that have been imposed upon the way in which these benefits can be
realized are meant to prevent taxpayers in high-income brackets from abusing the
system to escape taxation. Otherwise, they might seek to benefit by claiming a
deduction for education-related expenditures in the name of other individuals,
especially those who do not intend, or are unlikely ever to utilize that
“investment” by working in their home country at subsequent dates.
16
A further problematic issue which the foregoing provisions are designed
to address is that an individual account holder might be myopically opportunistic,
and so seek to “cash in” the deduction immediately upon completing her studies,
after which she would permanently exit the domestic labor force. The imposed
minimum waiting period should serve to diminish the attractiveness of the scheme
to such individuals. In addition, because it seems desirable to provide the
Treasury with greater predictability in the reduction of taxable incomes due to the
liquidation of UIBEDAs, their conversion into an annuity-like stream of
deductions should be restricted to take place within a pre-specified number of
consecutive tax-years.
17
More generally, although it is desirable not to impose any limitations on
individuals’ freedom of action by virtue of their having opened an UIBEDA, that
principle is not violated by setting the provisions and parameters in a way that
would curtail abuse of the entitlement under the scheme.
18 For example, tighter
restrictions could be introduced to curtail opportunistic behavior by requiring that
to be eligible to exercise the liquidation option, the surrender date, T,
19 be
preceded by a minimum number M years during which the account-holder had
filed national income tax returns showing positive tax payments.
The effective after-tax yield on UIBEDAs would thus be determined by
three sets of conditions: the intervening history of the Treasury’s borrowing
rate(s), the progressiveness of the prevailing income tax schedule at the time of
the account’s liquidation, and the steepness of the individual’s earnings profile
during the period following their education and training investments. The first two
of these being under the government’s control, it is important that the rates in
effect at the time the particular individual’s “credit” was deposited in the
UIBEDA remained fixed throughout its life, whether or not the Treasury’s
borrowing rate actually changed. Keeping track of the implicit fiscal obligations
of the Treasury in respect to the credits in these accounts will not pose any real
burden for modern financial information systems.
It will be apparent that the novel instruments (UIBEDAs) created under
such a scheme not only would work to offset the taxation of the interest
component in the returns on investment in human capital, but, because their value
is increased by utilizing that asset in employment at higher earnings rates within
the domestic economy, they add to agents’ incentives to use their acquired skills
in that manner. UIBEDAs, therefore, have the expected effect of raising future tax9
revenues derived from whatever public subsidies had been given to the
individuals during their education in their country of origin.
3. A Numerical Illustration
To illustrate the magnitudes of the incentives that might be created under
a scheme of this kind, we can assume the following investment cost, earnings
profile and tax parameters:
(a) total private costs of university education amount to 60K;
(b) 0.33 of total private costs are direct costs, the remainder being foregone
earnings;
(c) the 15K of total private direct costs are pre-paid by the individual’s family
and an UIBEDA in her name is established at the end of the tax year in which she
matriculated, at age 17;
(d) 0.06 per annum is the government’s nominal borrowing, set for the
account at that date;
(e) the graduate’s earnings profile starts at 15K and rises by 7 percent per
annum from graduation at age 20 until age 30, and grows thereafter at 3.5 percent
per annum until age 45 after which it remains flat (at 50.7K) until retirement at
age 60;
(f) non-educational deductions amounting to 5.0 percent are allowed on gross
earnings above 10K;
(g) the marginal rate of tax on taxable wage earning is rising between broad
earnings bands, as follows: 0.10 in 8K-14.99K, 0.15 in the 15K-24.99K, 0.25 in
the 25K-44.99K, and 0.30 for 45K and above;
(h) the UIBEDA account value is liquidated in equal annual deduction claims
o v e r( M= )5y e a r s ;
(i) The maximum allowed life of an UIBEDA is T2 = 25 years; and the
minimum permissive age before an account can be realized is T1 = 3 years, i.e.,
given assumption (c), upon graduation at age 20.
An array of alternative outcomes can be generated, by varying the date at
which the account-holder exercises her option to begin taking the (five years
worth of) UIBEDA deductions:10
Table 1
Calculation of the UIBEDA’s Scheme’s Tax Impact for Individual Beneficiaries
=====================================================================
Graduate’s age at start of liquidation: 20 25 30 35 40 45
______________________________________________________________________________
Nominal Value of UIBEDA (000’s) 24.0 32.4 43.6 49.0 80.0 107.0
Gross wage income (000’s) 15.0 21.3 30.0 35.7 42.6 50.7
Annual value of realized UIBEDA (000’s) 4.8 6.5 8.7 9.8 16.0 21.4
Taxable income after UIBEDA (000’s) 9.6 14.2 19.1 24.1 25.0 27.3
Annual tax savings from UIBEDA (000’s) 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.5 4.0 5.3
=====================================================================
Note: See text discussion for underlying assumptions.
It should be noticed that under the schedules assumed in this illustration,
the nominal value of the UIBEDA’s yield of tax-savings becomes substantial if
these are deferred until after age 40, thereby creating an incentive to defer
exercising the deduction and, instead, using it as a vehicle for (educational
earnings-contingent) savings. This may be seen by comparing the present value at
age 20 of 4K worth of annual tax-savings realized at ages 40-44, which is 1.2K, or
well more than twice the value of exercising the deduction entitlement at age 20,
immediately upon post graduation employment.
20
Looking at the scheme from a different angle, and assuming constancy of
these parameters, the 20K (or 25K) in nominal tax savings received between at
ages 40-44 (or ages 45-49, respectively), would be sufficient to meet the direct
educational investment costs of one of the graduate’s children, assuming that child
had been born when the graduate herself was age 25-26 (or age 30-31).
By the same token, had the new graduate’s mother achieved the same
earned income level by the time she was age 40-44, under this scheme she would
be in a position to receive 20K-25K worth of tax-savings. Conveniently, under the
assumptions, this amount would be available to be applied towards meeting the
current direct educational costs of a college-bound child of her own. From the
standpoint of the overlapping generations envisaged in these examples, the
UIBEDA thus would function as an individual tax-sheltered, government
guaranteed educational endowment fund.11
4. Can UIBEAs pay for themselves? Public financial intermediation under an
inter-temporal “balanced budget” restriction
An important issue for consideration now is whether the proposed scheme
can or cannot satisfy an “inter-temporal balanced budget constraint” – a condition
that a prudent Treasurer might well be disposed to impose on any such fiscal
innovation that involved the surrender of tax revenues.
It is easiest to see what is involved in answering this question by starting
from the conditions most favorable to the UIBEDA proposal, namely, where the
individual completing university has been induced to do so by the existence of the
prospective income tax deductions. It is then straightforward to show -- under
plausible specifications regarding the effects on the typical individual’s expected
earnings profile of having undertaken the educational investment described in
Section 3: Table 1 -- that the Treasury can do better than “break even” in present
value terms. By engaging in this form of financial intermediation, the public
sector can emerge with a tax revenue surplus.
To demonstrate this, the foregoing set of assumptions --(a) through (i) in
Section 3 – can be augmented by another:
(j) Instead of attending and completing university, the representative agent’s
alternative opportunity is to enter the labor market with a high school
completion certificate, and receive a stream of earnings that yield taxable
wage income of 12K at age 17, rising to 14K at 20, 17K at 25, and 20K by age
30, but remaining constant thereafter.
Given that empirically plausible specification, the average “college
differential” in earnings streams and the corresponding expected incremental
income tax revenues recovered on those differences can be calculated, and
discounted to find their present value at the date at which the UIBEDA deduction
credit was initially granted. For simplicity the latter will be taken to be the
individual’s 20
th birthday.
A rough approximation, using the tax rates and other parameters in the
previous illustrative example, and therefore discounting at the 6 percent long-term
government borrowing rate, puts the present value at age 20 of the incremental
education-associated tax revenues generated up though age 44 in the
neighborhood of 24K. As all but 3K of the latter is generated during the ages
between 29 and 44, it is plain that the Treasury can recover the (present value) of
the educational cost deduction credits awarded at age 20 without worrying about
the early labor market behavior of recent university graduates. In other words,
complete recoupment will be achieved even were the young worker to take her
training abroad after graduating, so long as she returned ten years later to
recommence working in her home country – and was able to command at least the
same, stipulated earnings profile for an university graduate with the equivalent of
10 years post-graduation work experience.12
Now consider what happens when the UIBEDA account is “cashed in” by
a worker at age 45 who had been in continuous employment up to that point. A
total of 26.5K in current tax savings enjoyed by her during that year and the
following 4 years has an initial (age 20) present value of 5.1K. But, to find the
present value (at that date) of the Treasury’s net incremental revenue burden, one
must consider that even with the UIBEDA deductions, the university graduate’s
taxable income is higher than that of the high school graduate. It therefore yields
as much as an extra 6.8K worth of nominally valued tax revenue per year when
she is in the age range from 45 through 49. The cumulated amount has a present
value of 6.5K at age 20, which means that there actually would be a small net gain
for the Treasury, amounting to (6.5-5.1 =) 1.4K – even during the years when the
UIBEDA deductions were being realized.
Quite obviously, there are further earnings differentials and corresponding
incremental tax revenues to be enjoyed, if our representative worker does not
withdraw from the domestic labor force after exercising her deduction credit
entitlements. Suppose she continues in employment between age 50 and 60: in the
scenario envisaged, the present value (at age 20) of the cumulated incremental
income tax receipts flowing to the Treasury from this educated agent’s earnings in
the decade preceding retirement would approach 9K.
There are several ways in which to interpret the availability of the
aggregated (4K + 1.4K + 9K = 14.4K) worth of “present value tax revenue
surplus” that emerges from the foregoing calculations.
(1) Under the assumption that the representative worker in each case would be
employed continuously up until age 60, the inter-temporal balance budget
constraint would be satisfied even if much smaller differentials existed between
the expected earnings profiles of high school and university graduates.
(2) The same would hold were an allowance to be made for less than full-time
employment by the average college graduate: an expected rate of
unemployment from all causes that averaged out at 9 percent per year (in every
year from age 20 through age 60), combined with a proportionate one-third
lowering of the graduate’s full-time earnings profile would leave the inter-
temporal balanced budget constraint satisfied, i.e., (.09 + .33)(24K +1.4K +9K)
= 20K.
(3) Alternatively, the figures imply that the direct costs of university training
these additional college attendees could be publicly subsidized at a cost of
14.4K, so that a total (public and private) educational investment outlay
amounting to 34.4K per student could be justified under this proposal as being
consistent with maintenance by the Treasury of its inter-temporal balanced
constraint.
(4) One also may conclude from the foregoing that the growing risks of
disability and death, or of retirement and emigration after age 50, would not13
pose a considerable threat to the Treasury’s ability to satisfy the inter-temporal
balanced budget constraint.
But now it is necessary to re-consider the premise for the preceding
calculation, namely, that the gains and costs to the Treasury are solely those
arising from the behavior of agents who the UIBEDA scheme induced to attend
and complete a university education. Obviously, that is not realistic. The
UIBEDA benefits (which produce losses of tax revenue for the Treasury) also
would be enjoyed by some people who in any case would have completed their
university education (and gained the associated differential earnings). The
Treasury gains no incremental tax revenues by granting such persons a UIBEDA
deduction.
So, the question of interest can be framed this way: In the context of our
illustrative example, what fraction (p) of each cohort of college graduates would
have to be induced by the UIBEDA scheme to obtain their degree, in order for the
Treasury to cover the lost revenues on the other (1-p) portion, and thus “break
even”? The answer can be obtained almost immediately from the estimates
produced in the foregoing calculations. Since the 1-p of the cohort cost the
Treasury a present value tax revenue loss of 5.1K per capita, and p generate a
present value tax revenue surplus of 34.K per capita, the magnitude that perfectly
balance the one against the other in this case is p = 0.12. In other word, an
increase in the pre-UIBEDA number of high-school graduates who go on to
graduate from college of only 13.6 percent ([0.12/0.88] x 100) would suffice for
the UIBEDA scheme to pay for itself –- in present value terms.
On its face, this seems a rather modest required impact on college
participation (and completion) rates. Even allowing for a 10 percent average
probability of yearly earnings losses (due to unemployment and disabilities)
among the induced increment of college degree holders, still the inducement
effect required for the UIBEDA scheme to “break-even” at only 16 percent. But,
for a country such as US, where the faction of the high school graduates who go
on to complete college is already as large as 0.7-0.8, moving up to the 0.81- 0.93
range is not likely to be so readily accomplished simply by means of financial
subsidies.
21 On the other hand, in a country where the faction of secondary
school-leavers that complete university is closer to 0.4 (as it is in contemporary
Britain, the 16 percent gain entailed in reaching the 0.46 level does not appear
unachievable by means of incentives such as those which the UIBEDA scheme
would provide.
Unfortunately, there is not very much quantitative evidence that allows
one to carry this exploratory discussion much farther. A notable exception to the
paucity of direct evidence is the body of econometric findings recently provided
by James Heckman and his collaborators. It has led them to conclude that in the
U.S. the financing of post-secondary school education does not constitute a
significant obstacle to university attendance by males, save for a quite small
segment of the population.
22 The observation of a marked positive correlation14
between parental family income and college participation rates, however, is on
this view attributable to structural factors of a more long-run nature: motivational
and environmental factors that result in the disadvantages of poor educational
preparation and self-image that burden children in many low income households
environments, reducing their ability to meet university admission requirements
and lowering confidence in being able complete a degree program leading to
credentials that will prove valuable in the labor market.
If short-term financing constraints were indeed the serious obstacle to
human capital formation in countries other than the US, tax reforms of the sort
considered here probably would not be the best policy instrument with which to
tackle that problem. Yet, there is another source of difficulty relating to the private
financing of higher education that may be successfully addressed by the
introduction of the UIBEDA scheme. It appears that in some high-income
societies young adults and their parents in lower income households are reluctant
to accumulate substantial personal indebtedness – especially without there being
any corresponding tangible asset (such as a house, or a car) that could serve
eventually to repay the debt.
23 Even in the U.S. it has been noticed that the take-
up rates on subsidized college loans under government programs targeted towards
students from low income families remains low: more people are eligible to claim
this form of support that do so.
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Such behavior is not so difficult to understand: coming from family
settings where as a rule there is no prior history of successful educational-based
economic advancement, these youngsters would be reasonable in attaching a high
risk discount to the economic returns that they are told can be anticipated on this
form of investment. It is true that the loan default penalties as a rule are not
exacting. But the tenets of “financial responsibility” with which aspirant middle-
class parents of modest means are likely to implant in their offspring prospect do
not encourage a relaxed attitude toward the prospects of carrying an unpaid debt
of significant size in relation to post-graduate earnings. They are thus wary of the
risks of beginning adult life and having to seeking responsible positions of
employment while burdened by a bad credit rating, should they become unable to
maintain the scheduled educational loan repayments.
This line of explanation is at least consistent with the observation that rates
of continuation to university among secondary school-leavers vary positively with
family context factors that are correlated with persistent parental income levels,
with parental (especially mother’s) educational attainments, and with indicators of
the individual’s academic ability.
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Thus, by giving individuals a deferred yield, work-contingent asset
coupled to their educational debts, the UIBEDA scheme conceivably could
contribute to counter-acting such inhibitions about borrowing for one’s university
education, and encourage planning for that of one’s children.15
It may be remarked, further, that the conceptually and empirically useful
distinction which may be drawn between short-run credit constraints and long-run
(family background) factors constraining participation in higher education should
not obscure the point that expectations matter, so that it is only the unanticipated
short-run constraints that are clearly distinguishable. The point frequently is made
that human capital formation is an extended dynamic process, in which each stage
builds upon foundations created at a prior stage.
26 The logic of this justifies the
view that providing higher education subsidies for youths whose families did not
expect them to be able to attend university is not likely to be effective in fostering
higher rates of college enrollment among those groups in the population. Hence,
the very same considerations which argue that there will be only rather weak
short-run effects of educational subsidies targeted to students from low-income
families, suggests that that institutionalized credible expectations of the future
availability of loans and tax subsidies for scholastically qualified young people
would have much bigger positive effects in eliciting higher university enrollment
rates. Their effects would work through the alteration of the family environment
during childhood and adolescence, and hence would exceed those identified
simply with the removal of short-run credit constraints during the period of
university attendance.
5. Extending UIBEDA Eligibility to International Migrants
An extensive economic literature has been devoted to the subject of
international migration and its effects upon income in the sending countries. The
portions of it that are generally thought to be most immediately germane to
policies affecting a region’s human capital endowments usually focus upon the
effects of so-called “brain drains.”
27 Emigration of the more able, and more highly
educated and skilled members of the population provides a form of windfall
capital transfer to immigration regions. The prospect of an uncontrolled
redistribution from developing economies where human capital is relatively
scarce, toward the economically advanced, high income economies where
complementary resources are available to employ such assets at much higher
private marginal rates of return, is indeed a source for serious concern.
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This is so especially in development contexts where there are critical
scarcities of educated personnel required to maintain the minimal functions of a
modern government, to effect the transfer of superior technologies, and to
facilitate economic and political interactions with other more economically
advanced societies. On the other hand, in countries that enjoy substantial supply-
side capabilities for expanding the numbers who can be trained, and where the
problem is one of insufficient private demand for investment in human capital,
efforts to curtail out-migration of the highly trained may well be counter-
productive. Their effect may be to further weaken private incentives to invest in
education.16
Conversely, investment in human capital might be increased in some
situations by allowing nationals (whose expected earnings potentials would
thereby be raised) to choose to work abroad in order to realize those benefits
gains. This effect could alter the investment behavior of a much larger portion of
the population than that which actually would emigrate, and therefore might well
increase the net positive impact of public subsidies upon the domestic rate of
human capital formation.
29
Where a liberal policy stance on the “brain drain” question is thus
warranted, the implications for the implementation of the UIBEDA scheme are
quite clear. All who had borne some of the direct and indirect costs of investing in
their education and training should be eligible to accumulate and hold deduction
credits in a UIBEDA, whether or not they subsequently take their human capital
abroad. Transparently, the UIBEDA would be of value to those who emigrated
only if they returned to take employment at home at a later point in their careers,
hopefully with their productivity having been enhanced by the intervening foreign
work experience.
Establishing automatic deductibility would result in emigrating nationals
receiving claims to UIBEDA benefits whose rising future value would constitute
an inducement for them to return to their country of origin after gaining further
training and work experience abroad. This aspect of the proposal thus may be
viewed as a means of encouraging voluntary repatriation among more highly
educated nationals whose knowledge, skills and overseas connections that are
likely to be of considerable value in their country of origin.
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Although it is likely that such individuals would have made further,
indirect investments in human capital whilst working outside their country of
origin, such expenditures need not eligible for further deduction credits in their
UIBEDA accounts. Closing that option will eliminate a source of considerable
administrative costs
Turning now from the question of the eligibility of emigrating nationals
for UIBEDA-benefits, it should be observed that the application of the scheme in
the case of immigrants is likely to be even more potent for a small open economy.
Encouraging a substantial inflow of individual who have special, high skill
qualifications would tend to lower the costs and raise the profitability of the
domestic industries that made intensive use of such workers. Under competitive
conditions the benefits would be shared indirectly by others, as purchasers of their
goods and services. If the effects in the employing industries were to increase
investment for additional plant and equipment capacity, the accompanying
increases in labor input demands could be sufficient to counteract the downward
relative price effect of immigration on the level of remuneration offered to new,
domestically trained workers. Consequently, the moderating effects of an inflow
of trained workers from abroad upon the incipiently rising local wage premia paid
to workers with particular occupational skills need not result in a weakening of the
long-run incentives for the domestic population to invest in such training.17
The general point that ought to have become apparent in the foregoing
discussion is that programs promoting selective immigration, on the one hand, and
tax policies promoting human capital formation in the domestic population, on the
other, can be designed in ways that render them dynamic complements. When
their effects are considered over a suitably extended but nonetheless finite time
horizon, it seems quite natural to make short-run use of the features of the
UIBEDA scheme as an instrument to promote selective immigration by non-
nationals who have made education and training investments in other parts of the
world. The mechanism of selection available to the government in this case is the
determination of the list of eligible overseas training institutions, and the date of
receipt of specified degrees and competence certifications that would qualify
immigrants to set up UIBEDA accounts when they first entered employment.
Evidence would need to be submitted also to establish the direct expenditures
incurred overseas in connection with obtaining those credentials. For
administrative simplicity, however, no deduction credits would be allowed for
indirect investments in the form of foregone earnings.
Where a foreign government has made provision for the extinguishing of such
educational debts as a condition for permitting the trainees to emigrate, or to
remain abroad in employment, the government of a skill-deficit region might
manage to recruit such workers by extending the UIBEDA scheme’s benefits to
them. Loan guarantees from the government in the region of immigration can
facilitate re-financing of external student indebtedness, and the expenditures
represented by the new, domestic loan can then be made eligible for treatment
within the UIBEDA scheme on the same basis as newly contracted educational
investments.
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Immigration offers the most direct and flexible means for a small economy
to transform its domestic labor supply conditions in order to facilitate particular
lines of economic expansion. The evident intention of the foregoing proposals is
to place in the hands of the government another (fiscal) tool that could encourage
a rapid inflow of migrants, thereby not only raising the average human capital
endowment of the working age population, but doing so in a controlled and
selectively targeted manner.
What of the drawbacks? It is likely that a country which extended its
UIBEDA scheme to encourage selective immigration and repatriation would be
accused of engaging in a “beggar thy neighbor” tax policy. If successful, it would
be seen as inducing “brain drains” from other regions. Nevertheless, it is
important to distinguish the present idea from the broad class of “industrial
policies” and “commercial policies” that are more properly labeled “protectionist”
and detrimental to global economic welfare. Tariffs and subsidies for domestic
producers are instruments of national economic policy that give rise to both local
and global inefficiencies. But, by contrast the removal of differential taxation that
is discouraging to individual investment in human capital works to improve the
allocation of resources in the economy that implements the reform.18
As is the case with protective tariffs and strategic trade policies more
generally, extension of the UIBEDA scheme’s benefits to cover immigrants could
provoke retaliation from other countries – especially those who perceived
themselves to be losing the services of their highly trained and uncommonly
productive workers.
32 Retaliation in kind would seek to neutralize the effects of
the external reform by removing the disability that their own tax regime placed
upon human capital investments and possibly including coverage for immigrants.
Unlike retaliatory protectionism, however, the result of generalized reaction of
this sort would make capital markets function more inefficiently in the long run --
both intra- and internationally. It is true that the benefits to the initiating
reformer(s) eventually would be dissipated as a result of the global response. That,
however, is not an argument against implementing the proposed reform in the first
place; indeed, if the threat of retaliation carries any implications for policy, it
would seem to argue for moving quickly to introduce the UIBEDA and thereby
realize the “first mover” advantages that a small, open economy would obtain
under the scheme.
6. Concluding observations on issues of implementation
For such a program to be effective it is essential that its statutory
provisions should clearly prevent subsequent alterations (whether by executive or
legislative action) in the obligations of the government as those are defined by the
terms of established UIBEDA holdings.
Apart from the necessarily variable current government nominal
borrowing rate that sets the yield on deduction credits, the terms of individual
UIBEDAs ought to remain fixed throughout the life of these accounts. Of course,
establishing a reasonable measure of “credible commitment” on this issue would
not require binding future governments to leave tax rates unaltered, or rule out
changes in expenditure eligibility provisions that applied in the cases of new
entrants to the system.
Conceptually, what is appropriate is to render the assets formed within
each UIBEDA as secure from the risk of default as are the government’s debt
instruments. Domestic inflation is a form of “constructive default” on the part of
the state, the risk of which would (or should) be a concern for those being
encouraged to acquire the new species of public obligation represented by the
UIBEDA. In view of the fact that the great bulk of these obligations will held by
tax-paying residents, this issue can readily be addressed by fixing the real yield on
deductions credited to these accounts, and linking the nominal value of the latter
to the domestic consumer price index. There would be no need to provide separate
protection against the risk of depreciation in the country’s currency vis-à-vis other
currencies.19
The problem of establishing the credibility of the government’s
commitment to the proposed program of tax reform can be approached from
another direction, by taking note of a feature of the UIBEDA scheme that would
have the effect of rendering its adoption less readily reversible. Once in place, it
would complement policies of replacing direct subsidies for higher education
expenditures with regime of financing based on a mixture of (publicly guaranteed)
loans and (means tested) grants to needy students. That is a transition which many
high-income countries will find themselves having to undertake as they seek to
raise the proportion of secondary school-leavers who go on to university.
33 Once
“all but free tuition” and maintenance allowances for all but university students
from low-income families had been withdrawn, and replaced by government
guaranteed education loans, the benefits promised under of the UIBEDA scheme
would become quite difficult for a representative government to abrogate or
significantly curtail without inciting middle-class outrage and retaliation at the
polls.
Plainly, one intention underlying the proposal to introduce UIBEDA-like
reforms in the context of developing economies is to create a future material
“opportunity” that would not only transform popular attitudes about the value of
undertaking investment in the further education of secondary school-leavers and
university graduates, but would tend to promote a more general attitudinal change.
Governmental commitment to these modest fiscal reforms could go some way
towards fostering a greater awareness of the palpable benefits that individuals and
their families could anticipate deriving by embracing the more general cultural
and psychological orientation that is associated commonly with deferral of
gratification and personal commitments to forward planning touching many
aspects of human life.
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ENDNOTES
1 David and Goddard, (2001: sect. II (2)), provides an extensive review of the
theoretical and empirical economics literature relating to these propositions, including
material from historical studies. See Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) for a recent study of
the OECD countries that finds recent econometric support for the asserted impact of
human capital formation on economic growth during the second half of the 20
th century.
For a related discussion of the links between policy settings, institutions and economic
growth in 21 OECD countries over the period 1971-1998, based on a survey of recent
economics journal publications, descriptive quantitative material and cross-country time-
series regression analyses, see Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001).
2 See, e.g., Judd 1998; Steuerle 1996.
3 See Kaplow (1996). Under accrual accounting the returns from investment are
included in current income; the costs of the asset are capitalized (not immediately
expensed) and depreciated at a rate reflecting its “economic service life”, i.e., the
temporal change in the present value of the remaining stream of returns; current
depreciation charges are set against current income. Were accrual income taxes to be
applied to human capital, the effect would be less favorable to investment in education
and training than the conventional income tax regime. The reason is that such
investments tilt the time-profile of earnings upwards, and conventional income taxes do
not impose additional taxes on the implicit interest component of higher later returns –
whereas an accrual income system would do so.
4 See, e.g., Boskin 1977, Davies and Whalley 1991, Trostel 1993, Dupor et al.,
1996, Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998, Judd 1998.
5 Furthermore, for the sake of consistency and completeness, the central tax
authority should allow individuals to deduct from taxable income any mandatory
community tax payments that were devoted to local public education and training23
activities. The latter step would preserve neutrality in the tax treatment of privately vs.
publicly provided educational services.
6 Physical capital goods purchased by businesses cannot be fully “expensed”, i.e.,
set off against earnings by firms that pay corporate income taxes; instead, most national
and local tax codes allow depreciation charges on these durables to be deducted from
gross earnings.
7 Both features of the proposed reform are mimicked by the less sweeping
proposal to shift to a “flat tax” on wage income, with full deductibility of human capital
costs.
8 In the first case the tax bias tends to promote rapid turnover of elements of the
tangible capital stock that embody recent technological innovations; in the second case
the tax bias works to compensate for the greater systematic obsolescence risks to which
owners of human capital are exposed by policies that promote more rapid rates of
advance of fundamental knowledge and technological progress.
9 By comparison, the option of sheltering pension contributions (with equal pre-
taxes rates of return) is a more attractive vehicle for personal savings, pension proceeds --
unlike the returns from educational investments -- typically are realized (during
retirement) when earned income levels and marginal rates of income taxation are
expected to be lower.
10 The paradigmatic approach to the problem (following Heckman 1976)
postulates that individuals make educational investment decisions within the framework
of a model of inter-temporal expected utility maximization, subject to the constraints of a
human capital production function and private borrowing in perfect (financial) capital
markets. Dupor et al. 1996, for example, econometrically estimate the parameters of a
life-cycle human capital investment model of US white males (based upon synthetic
cohort data for various educational attainment groups in the 1970 Census), and use these
to simulate the effects of various tax regimes.
11 In other words, the (arc-) elasticity of education and training investment with
respect to the marginal tax rate is roughly – 1.5.
12 This proposition is brought out in the work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987,
Davies and Whaley 1991, Heckman, Lochner and Taber 1998, and Trostel 1993.
13 Consequently, as Trostel (1993) shows, the after-tax interest rate in the
economy’s steady-state equilibrium need not be raised by removing taxes on human
capital investment.
14 Although this may achieve the purpose of augmenting the stock of human
capital in the receiving country, it would do so without stimulating additional investment
in education and training among the pre-existing population – except indirectly, under
some special conditions. Indeed, if immigrants who have been educated abroad bring
capabilities that render them substitutes rather than complements for domestically trained
members of the workforce, it is conceivable that an unrestricted inflow from overseas
will so alter domestic labor supply conditions as to depress the demand for “in-country”
training. See Section 6 below for further discussion.
15 Further, it may be noted that where local tax authorities subsidize educational
and vocational training programs and use local excise and property taxes for that purpose,
and where all such taxes are not already treated as deductible under the national tax code,24
that fraction of local tax rates attributable to the subsidies (as announced by local
authorities) could be used by households to calculate an allowable deduction.
16 If the tax-benefits derived were to be significantly separated from the size of
the incremental earnings power created by the “deductible expenses,” a serious problem
of moral hazard would arise: there would be little incentive for “educational investors”
seeking to tax-shelter future (other) income to care about the efficacy of the
educational/training services they purchased.
17 As described thus far these deductions would start no sooner than year T1,a n d
end no later than T2 after the account was first established; the entire value of the account
would have to be liquidated by exercising deduction claims (in equal amounts) spread
over the N consecutive years, where N = T2 -T 1. Individuals would be free to privately
insure against the risks of disability or other sources of taxable personal income losses
during the N years when their UIBEDA was being liquidated.
18 Or enable it to satisfy an inter-temporal balanced budget constraint, a
requirement that is considered in Section 4.
19 Following the notation in footnote 9, the surrender date must satisfy the
restrictions: T1< T<(T + M) < T2.
20 As will be seen in Section 4 (below), the viability of the scheme from the
Treasury’s standpoint will depend upon the gross pre-tax rate of incremental earnings
growth from educational investments being expected to maintain a long-term yield rate
that exceeds the yield on long-term government borrowing. Otherwise, the scheme
becomes a (low) minimum yield guarantee for private investments in human capital
formation.
21 More will be said on this matter, below.
22 This view has emerged from the findings reported by Cameron and Heckman
(1998), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli (2002). They
report that short-run credit constraints are binding in the case of only 4 percent of the
male population.
23 Or, in the case of appreciating assets, provide collateral for additional
borrowing in future emergency circumstances. Systematic evidence on “the willingness
to borrow” is lacking. Britain, however, the fear among low income students and their
families of having accumulated substantial debt upon graduation is widely accepted as a
constraint on the restructuring higher education finances. This reluctance to make use of
existing student loan programs is cited in connection with the observation that the Labour
government’s withdrawal of student maintenance grants and the introduction of modest
fees in 2000 was followed by a decline in the proportion of university enrolments
comprised of students from low-income families. As a consequence, favorable
consideration presently is being given by the Treasury to provide “higher education
maintenance allowances” (HEMA’s) on a means-tested basis to students in the 16-18 age
range who remained in full time (secondary) education, and to university student in the
18 plus age range. For many students whose parental family incomes fall in the range
below £30,000, the contemplated MEMA would cover the present university fees. See,
e.g., “Grants may be restored for poorer students,” The Guardian, 9 August 2002, p.2
24 Carneiro and Heckman (2002) cite Orfield’s (1992) findings that students who
are eligible for Pell Grants and Perkins Loans do not claim support from those sources.25
Various explanations have been suggested, ranging from the complexity of the
applications process to the view that students from low-income families anticipate low
(risk adjusted) rates of return that simply do not justify the investment of the opportunity
costs of college attendance. See Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli (2002) for further
discussion.
25 See Cameron and Heckman 1998, and Carniero, Heckman and Manoli (2002).
26 See, e.g., David and Goddard (2001) for a synthetic review of the literature on
this theme; Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli (2002: p. 69) sum up the same point
succinctly: “Learning begets learning because of dynamic complementarities.”
27 See, e.g., Bhagwati and Wilson 1989; World Bank 1995.
28 Thus, the World Development Report (World Bank, 1995, p. 64) asks: “Can
something be done to stop the exodus of trained workers from poorer countries?”
29 See, e.g., Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997) ; Stark and Wang (2000).
30 Given the parameters of the calculations in Sections 3 and 4, it can be seen that
for individuals in the age range between 35 and 45, the relocation costs of repatriation
otherwise would become a disincentive which firms in the home region would have to
overcome in order to repatriate them.
31 In effect, immigrants with “approved” educational credentials could be made
eligible (upon entering domestic employment) to receive educational loans in the amount
of their pre-existing indebtedness on the same terms as are available to residents,
provided those funds are applied to extinguish their previously incurred debts. Upon
doing so, the full amount of such outlays could be made the basis on which UIBEDA
credits would be accumulated. A more cautious approach might be adopted, in order to
increase the probability that the re-financing loans would be repaid: UIBEDA credits
would be granted only upon production of evidence of actual domestic loan repayments.
In principle, such a scheme could be implemented using private lenders for the re-
financing activity, with some government guarantees to keep interest rates at the same
level as those being offered to domestic students.
32 Other nations might chose an alternative strategic response to an externally
induced “brain drain”: curtailing the freedom of its population to work abroad. This,
however, is completely analogous to blocking the outward movement of financial capital,
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33 This issue currently confronts the UK, where the university continuation rate
among secondary school leavers has risen to a bit over 42 percent and the Labour
government has announced 50 percent as the target rate to be reached by 2010. The latter
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for male high school completers (ages 18-24) whose parental families occupied the
bottom quartile of the family income distribution. The corresponding participation rates
for the top half of the family income distribution ranged from 61 to 81 percent. (See
Caniero and Heckman 2002: Figure 1). At present the Labour government in Britain
finds itself trying to cope with the legacy of the fiscally reckless but politically adroit
Conservative Party initiatives begun in the 1980s, which set in motion the rise in
university enrolment rates without providing proportionate incremental funding for26
higher education from general tax revenues. As a consequence, public funding for higher
education per student per university student declined by roughly 40 percent since the late
1970’s. See, e.g., “Higher education for all: the missing ingredient is a graduate tax,” The
Guardian, 9 August, 2002: p. 19.